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# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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VOL. XXX, I.

WHOLE NO. 117.

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## I.—STAHL'S SYNTAX OF THE GREEK VERB.

### THIRD ARTICLE.

Moods and Tenses is the natural sequence in English. It is the sequence in Goodwin, the sequence in my Problems of Greek Syntax. But, of course, it is hard to separate them in detailed treatment. Moods are temporal and Tenses are modal (A. J. P. XXIII 127); and in my Greek Syntax I have followed the order Tenses and Moods as Aken has done in his *Tempora und Modi*, as Stahl has done in the Syntax of the Greek Verb, which I take up again for others. For myself as for all special students of the subject the book is an *ineluctabile fatum* and will hold me in its grip to the end.

Stahl begins, as we all begin, with Apollonios and finds himself forced to admit that the old grammarian's *ψυχικὴ διάθεσις* (A. J. P. XXIII 126) is based on a correct view of the nature of the moods. Yet he contends that it cannot be called a definition because it does not give the *differentia specifica*, which means so much more to a German than 'specific difference' does to us, at least to judge by the way in which Stahl plays with German and Latin synonyms (A. J. P. XXIX 264). The Greek word for mood is *ἐγκλισις*—a poor word as it would seem, because it is also used for *accentus inclinatio*. But after all, 'tone' of utterance is not so bad a description of mood (S. C. G. 183). It seems a pity that *διάθεσις* has been appropriated for 'voice'—but Stahl cites Schol. Theod. II 5, 6 (=Gr. Gr. IV 2, p. 5, l. 2), which makes *ἐγκλισις* equivalent to *διάθεσις*: *καθ' ὃ ἐγκλίνεται ἡ ψυχὴ ἡγοῦν εἰς ὃ ῥέπει ἡ ψυχὴ*—a figure taken from scales and weights. How sad to find the sacrosanct realm of syntax invaded by a

naughty trope (A. J. P. XXIX 239) and a trope that has evidently been imported into the word, which means nothing more than *κλίσις* does in the noun.

Stahl now attacks the problem of the meaning of the several moods, the problem of the possibility of reaching a basic signification for the same. 'Basic significations' are not in good odor just now. 'Sphere of usage' is safer or 'types of application' (A. J. P. II 84). Indicative and Imperative he dismisses as too clear for discussion and spends all his energies on Subjunctive and Optative. 'The basic signification', says Stahl, 'must be sought in the simple sentences and in the oldest documents'. Then follows a long argument to prove that language began with simple sentences and that parataxis is earlier than hypotaxis. <Unfortunately, hypotaxis came in before our record. Simple sentences are not necessarily easier than compound, and in this whole discussion I am often reminded of the silliness of Swiss Family Robinsons in words of one syllable, as if one syllable were necessarily easier than two. But the great trouble is with the oldest documents and now classical scholars are asking one another 'with a wild surmise' whether the underground stream of language which has come to light of late may not be of more value than the oldest documents. The appeal is to Homer, as Paul's was to Caesar; but alas! for Paul's pseudo-poet on the throne and our real poet on the throne. The Homeric evidence must be accepted with great caution, as has been repeatedly urged, e. g., A. J. P. XXIV 353. The simplicity may be an artificial simplicity. The predominance of parataxis over hypotaxis is a matter of style as well as of period. Hypotaxis holds fast to constructions that parataxis has abandoned. The futural subjunctive abides defiantly in the dependent clause of temporal sentences and dares the future indicative to invade its domain. The modal nature of the future, obscured in the principal sentence, forces itself upon the most superficial observer in the dependent clause. A rude inscription of a late date may be more instructive than the artistic language of the epic (A. J. P. XXIII 253 foll.). That means, of course, that we have to restudy all our problems. But that necessity is one of the conditions of a progressive science like Syntax.>

It is an old story—we have many twice-told tales in Stahl—this advance from the simple structure of the sentence in Homer to the elaborate periods of Isokrates, from the *λέξις εἰρομένη* to the

λέξις κατεστραμμένη, both terms that, by the way, seem to have come from the Ionic home of the Epos. <But there are long sentences, balanced sentences in Homer, who does not hesitate to transcend the limit of the period as laid down by the rhetoricians. It is not a matter of advance in art merely; it is a matter of sphere.> This familiar theme of the growth of the hypotactic sentence Stahl proceeds to illustrate by the hypothetical sentence and by the relative sentence, both illustrations based on disputed assumptions. To him *εἰ* is 'da', 'so' (cf. L. G.<sup>3</sup> 590, N. 1), and the relative is originally an anaphoric demonstrative (A. J. P. XXIX 259). This leads him to discuss *ὃς τε*, in the *τε* of which he sees a copulative conjunction and not he alone. Those who, like Stahl, translate *ὃς τε* 'and he', are fooled by their own translation. 'He also' would probably be nearer the mark. Only the German 'also' and the English 'also' differ portentously, a significant lesson in semantics. Whatever the first meaning of *τε*, the doubling of it, *τε . . . τε*, which is the original use (according to Delbrück, S. F. IV 145), produces the effect of correlation, as much so as if *τε—τε* were *ὡς—οὕτως* (A. J. P. XXIII 256). *τε—καί* follows suit with the effect of *ὡς—οὕτω καί*. The business style of the ISS is averse to *τε—καί* and the less processional orators do not affect it, as Fuhr taught us a generation ago, just as they do not overdo *οὕτως—ὥστε*, of which Isokrates is so fond (A. J. P. XIV 241). Isokrates had time enough or took time enough for this artistic parade. This correlation helps to explain the connotation 'so' (Monro, H. G. § 331 n.), and 'who-so' readily becomes 'whoso', readily becomes generic, like *ὅστις* which was originally not the generic but the characteristic relative. Monro considers *ὃς τε* generic,<sup>1</sup> H. G., § 266, and the fact that *ὅστις* kills *ὃς τε* is not without meaning. The crowding out of *ὡς* by *ὥς τε* in the consecutive sentence can not be explained on the 'copulative conjunction' theory nor the curious difference between *οἶος* and *οἴός τε*, *οἶος* giving the character (disposition), *οἴός τε* the situation (position). See A. J. P. VII 165. The distinction, as I have put it, has been widely accepted. Stahl says that *οἶος* is 'Beschaffenheit', *οἴός τε* 'Vermögen' (p. 496), though he grants that the especial sense 'imstande sein' is prevalently expressed by *οἴός τε*. <An impertinent fellow is represented in Plato's Republic 329 C as asking Sophokles some home questions as to

<sup>1</sup> 'Ὅς τε', he says, 'lays stress on the general permanent element in facts.'

his standing in the Court of Love. The first question pertains to his state of mind, *πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὰ φροδίδια*; Comp. Conv. 176 C: *ἐπειδὴ οὖν μοι δοκεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν παρόντων προθύμως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πολὺν πίνειν οἶνον*. The state of mind (*οἶος*) is, of course, not unconnected with the state of body (*οἶός τε*), and that leads to the next question: *ἔτι οἶός τε εἰ γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι*; To this second question by a natural chiasmus Sophokles replies first with the usual formula in case of indecency *εὐφήμει* and proceeds to answer the other with more or less sincerity: *ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον* (*αὐτό* being = the d—d thing, A. J. P. XXVI 237). Cicero's translation (Cato Maior 47), which has helped to make the passage famous, is a poor and coarse affair. Quite apart from Cicero's lack of appreciation of the delicacies of Greek syntax—a matter that has been made evident, if that were needful, by special studies—it will be remembered that his recent experience with Publilia may not have been the most pleasant. The alliance was scarce contracted when it was dissolved.>

Stahl's method with the moods is this. Find the fixed usages that need no adminicles and separate them from the shifting usages, from the usages that are accompanied by a distinguishing tag. The fixed usages are those that are to be relied on as the original usages. The others are derivative. <But what are we to do in Latin? To me *velim* is *βουλοίμην ἄν*, to Professor Morris it is *βουλοίμην* (A. J. P. XVIII 139, XIX 231). Then something is to be said in favor of the clarification of language, of the survival of the essential. What does prose usage tell us? The pure subjunctive is an imperative everywhere. The tag *ἄν* turns the subjunctive into a more exact future, a future of assumption, which is limited to the dependent sentence. The optative is everywhere the mood of the wish, the dream, the fancy. *ἄν* turns it into a more exact future, a future of assertion, which is practically limited to the principal sentence. This is the sum of the whole matter, the result which Stahl reaches after pages and pages of disquisition. But it has the disadvantage of being crystalline and we must go back to the turbid genesis.>

The Homeric subjunctive appears in declarative sentences as well as in sentences of will, a subdivision of sentences of desire ('Begehren', *ἱμερος*). In declarative sentences it is used for the future. In sentences of 'desire', apart from prohibitive sentences and sentences of apprehension, the usage is confined to the first person both in the affirmative sentence and in the question.

In the former we have to do with the will of the subject, in the latter there is an appeal to the will of another. So we have (1) the voluntative (volitive) subjunctive which is limited to the first person and sways level with the positive imperative, in short, our old friend the 'geheischte Wirklichkeit' of Krüger, and (2) the futural subjunctive <also known as the prospective subjunctive> really a tense. In the deliberative question 'was will ich tun?' becomes 'was soll ich tun?' The English equivalents 'what will I do?—what shall I do?' may be paralleled in the English of Shakespeare's time and in the dialects (Scotch, Irish); but I dare not use the illustration for fear of being classed with those benighted people who, as Whitney says somewhere, confound their inclinations with their obligations—an epigrammatic remark intended for the southern tier of the United States, but linguistically applicable to a far wider range and ethically to everybody. The dubitative (deliberative) subjunctive needs no illustration. About some of the examples of the futural subjunctive one might quarrel. Indeed, it might be maintained that the parallel with the future is not conclusive as to the purely futural character. There is so to speak a *dei* shade about *τι πάθω* (S. C. G. 384); which *τι πέισομαι*; lacks. Nor does Stahl note the prevalence of the aorist tense which shows in my judgment a certain striving after a *futurum exactum*, in spite of recent theories, which minimize the aoristic character of the second aorist (A. J. P. XXIX 245). On its way to the *futurum exactum* the aor. subj. was checked by the development of the opt. and *äv* which crowded the subj. out of the principal sentence so that it had to be content with the domain of the subordinate clause, where it holds a court of its own as we have seen (A. J. P. XXIX 267).

But this use of the futural subjunctive in Homer, says Stahl, is not confined to the simple sentence. It is found in the dependent sentence as well and in like manner the voluntative of affirmative sentences appears in final clauses and in dependent deliberative questions. <To us who are born to the English tongue, who have to use 'will' and 'shall' for the future and shift them from person to person, from question to answer, to the provincial Frenchman who says: Il veut pleuvoir, this transfer from modal to temporal seems to be much ado about nothing. Why, the Greek himself occasionally used *ἐθέλω* for the future.>

We now approach the delimitation of the realm of the will between subjunctive and imperative. The subjunctive has the prov-

ince of the first person, the imperative the provinces of the second and third except in aoristic prohibitions in which the subj. has sway though in Homer μή with aor. subj. is confined to the second person.<sup>1</sup> This whole question is complicated with the merging of an original I. E. injunctive form with the subjunctive,—a difficult question which confronts every student on the very threshold of Greek syntax and which does not seem to have been brought any nearer to a solution by Stahl, and as the matter has been treated with great fulness by Professor C. W. E. Miller in this Journal—XIII 418–423 (comp. also Delbrück, *Vgl. Syntax*, II, pp. 356 and 364), I pass on to Stahl's treatment of sentences involving fear. According to him we must distinguish between the prohibitive subjunctive of prohibition and the prohibitive subjunctive of apprehension. These negative sentences, he says, have been 'shoved on' to verbs of fear and have thus become dependent. <Do they ever become really dependent? Are the clauses ever reversible, as happened though comparatively late in final sentences? It is precisely in these sentences of fear that the underlying parataxis makes itself felt and is more important. Neither in Greek nor in Latin can the constructions be brought out didactically without a resort to parataxis (L. G.<sup>3</sup> 550)>.

As the subjunctive is used in Homer in a futural sense, so the future, says Stahl, is used as an expression of will. In the one case we have a temporal use of the mood, in the other a modal use of the tense. <But what if the future was a mood to begin with?> The first person retains its modal force to a large extent. It is found, as we have seen, side by side with the subjunctive (see above, p. 5). The second and third persons in the simple sentence are purely indicative and the 'imperative' future with its negative οὐ is a prediction and not a command; nor is it less effective for being a prediction (S. C. G. 269; A. J. P. XVIII 121, XXIII 246).

The evidence for the voluntative character of the subjunctive, the theory which a few years ago was considered dead and buried (A. J. P. XXIX 368), is summed up thus: (1) The voluntative meaning is the fixed meaning. The futural sense vanishes after Homer and is confined to synthetic sentences. (2) This volun-

<sup>1</sup> Monro § 278, (a) cites for the third person, Il. 4, 37, where perhaps the passage may be taken paratactically, and Od. 22, 213, which seems distinctly imperative. Cf. also A. J. P. XIII 423, note 3. C. W. E. M.

tative meaning needs no prop, whereas the futural subjunctive usually takes the adminicle of  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$  and  $\alpha\nu$ , and in the later development is absolutely dependent on  $\alpha\nu$ . (3) The futural element is not of the essence of the subjunctive, since the necessity of a special futural form is felt even in Homer. If the futural element were of the essence of the subjunctive, the future indicative would have been superfluous. (4) As the futural meaning belongs to all the persons, why does the voluntative meaning limit itself to the first person—if indeed this meaning is a derivative from the futural sense? <If indeed!> (5) Remnants of futural presents show that the subjunctive was not the original expression of the future. (6) The voluntative meaning of the future is secondary <about which much has been said and more might be said>. (7) Analogies are not wanting for the use of expressions denoting 'will' to serve as futures. <But for that matter 'shall', which has an imperative significance, has also abundant analogies and in Earlier English 'shall' was so far deadened, not only in the first but also in the second and third persons, that the A. V. often produces a false impression on the reader of to-day, as all students of the English Bible know. (Cf. Moulton, Grammar of N. T. Greek, Prolegomena, p. 150 footn. See S. C. G. 370).

The optative in Homer represents not only desire but fancy ('Vorstellung'). As a mood of desire it conveys a wish of the speaker and either stands alone or is introduced by  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon$ ,  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  also by  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  alone, more rarely by  $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ . Now, as a wish is not accompanied by an effort after realization, it belongs to the region of 'Vorstellung', of fancy (p. 236), and so in the declarative sentence the optative as the mood of fancy may serve to express the view or opinion of the speaker. Furthermore, the wish may become a mere concession of a thing to be done, of a statement that is to be accepted. <But the examples of this optative of opinion practically = optative and  $\alpha\nu$  are very few and some of them by no means certain. As we exclude from certain spheres of Greek all aorists in which a flick of the pen will change  $\alpha$  into  $\epsilon$  and restore the normal future, so passages in which  $\gamma\epsilon$  occurs cannot be considered cogent, and other explanations often lie near. See the list in S. C. G. 450. Od. 14, 123 is not cited in full by Stahl. Now 'garbling' is a hard word to use but I have lived to see so much 'proved' by fragments of sentences that in my S. C. G. I have insisted on indicating gaps. Od. 14, 122-3 runs thus:  $\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\nu\ \alpha\eta\eta\rho\ \alpha\lambda\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \epsilon\lambda\theta\acute{\omega}\nu\ |\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\epsilon\iota\epsilon\ \gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\acute{\iota}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$



*νίον*, with a double *ᾶν* sound that might have seduced Sir Galahad. Not that I dispute the existence of a pure optative in the potential sense for the early period. There is no more theoretical difficulty about it than about the double sense of the opt. (subj.) in Latin (see above, p. 4), but we must insist on the close scrutiny of every alleged example or we shall be swamped with potentials in prose literature. See Wyse on Isaeus 3, 50, 1.

Stahl sums up for the optative as he has summed up for the subjunctive. (1) In sentences of desire the optative goes back to the wish. (2) The optative of fancy (*Vorstellung*) with overwhelming preponderance, indeed with comparatively greater preponderance than the subjunctive, takes to itself a modal particle. (3) In declarative sentences the optative loses its 'timelessness' and becomes futural. In Ionic Prose and Attic this futural signification of opt.+*ᾶν* appears only in principal and 'parathetic' clauses (A. J. P. XXIX 273). <The trouble, as has been already pointed out,—for I must allow myself to repeat (A. J. P. XXIX 402), as Stahl has allowed himself to repeat—lies in the want of a clear recognition of the difference between the time of the action and the time of the ascertainment of the action, a difference recognized in sentences of fear, which are especially valuable because of their primitive character, but not emphasized elsewhere. The resolution of the aor. opt. with *ᾶν* as a rough equivalent of the periphrastic perfect opt. with *ᾶν* serves to simplify matters, and I have not scrupled to call the aorist a shorthand perfect (S. C. G. 439).> (4) The wishing sense of the optative is further supported by the analogy of the subjunctive.

In Stahl the heart of the matter is usually wrapped up in a mass of verbiage. But now and then there is a luminous sentence as where he says 'das Gewünschte erscheint zugleich als Erfordernis'—(p. 240)—but he does not seem to see that this statement disposes of one of his pet examples of the timelessness of the opt., *ἔλοιτο* (A. J. P. XXIX 402).

And now we are called on to survey the weary road over which we have travelled, to distinguish again between the 'Urteilssatz'—the declarative sentence—and the 'Begehrungssatz'—the sentence of desire, the one objective, the other subjective. The indicative (*ὀριστική*) represents the predicate as a reality. It is the reigning mood of the declarative sentence. In the sentence of desire there is a distinction between will and wish. The wish is represented by the optative. When it comes to will, we ask whether the will has

to do with the action of the speaker or that of another. For the former the subjunctive (ὕποτακτική) is employed, for the latter the imperative (προστακτική). But the subjunctive has transcended its sphere. It has annexed the negative injunctive in the aorist and invaded the realm of the aor. imperative. Both <these saucy varlets> subjunctive and optative have encroached on the province of the indicative. The Will begets a Future, the Wish becomes father of a Thought. The Future begotten of the Will was legitimate enough so long as the first person only was the conceived person, but the Will proceeded to take possession of the other persons and to bar the way of the venerable imperative into the declarative sentence.

Now this I call descriptive syntax, not genetic syntax. It certainly does not give the *rationale* of the process and Stahl has not advanced the theory a jot; but I am pleased to observe that after the waterspout of words has passed, the indicative still represents the predicate as a reality, that the subjunctive still anticipates as an act of the will or an act of the judgment, swayed by the will, that the optative is still the mood of the wish and that the wish is still the father of the thought—and that Stahl's fellow-workmen in the grammatical field are not wiped off the face of the earth.

*Repetitio est mater studiorum* is the familiar Jesuit motto inscribed on the walls of Stonyhurst, and he is not a true teacher who does not drive the truth home by reiterated blows of the pedagogical hammer. But what is necessary in the classroom becomes intolerable in a text-book. One asks in amazement what kind of public is to be reached by this book of 800 pages on the syntax of the Greek verb. It is an insult to the only possible readers of such a work to have the beggarly elements of syntax flaunted before the eye of the mind, to be told over and over again that the definitions must be taken in a Pickwickian sense, that there must be a certain elasticity of conception, that there must be different ways of looking at things, that the indicative is no guarantee of objective truth—and that liars can use the indicative as freely as George Washington. But courage! Perhaps we shall have something new when we come to 'the historical development of the moods'.

'The historical development of the moods fulfils itself chiefly in the domain and under the influence of the dependent sentence' (A. J. P. XXIII 128). That is one way of putting it; but is it the

best way? There is, there can be, nothing in the dependent clause that has not its legitimate explanation in the behaviour of the leading clause. There is no new heaven for the optative to aspire to, no new earth for the indicative to plant its feet on.

In Stahl's treatment of the moods we find ourselves confronted again with absolute and relative. As we have had absolute and relative time, so we have absolute and relative modality. By absolute time is meant time relative to the speaker (A. J. P. XXIX 391). By relative time, time relative to something else. Absolute modality deals with the conception of the speaker, relative modality deals with the modality attributed to the person spoken of—attributed by whom? By the speaker. It is all the speaker.

The oldest form of repeating the words or thoughts of another is *oratio recta*. Some languages never get beyond that stage, says Stahl. In other languages, as in English, it is hard to say whether *oratio recta* or *oratio obliqua* is the easier (A. J. P. XXVII 206; cf. XXIX 264). The 'time-forshoving' seems to give no trouble at all. But that may be personal impressionism. In Greek the dependency is indicated by infinitive and participle and also by a number of introductory relative and interrogatory conjunctions. The person-forshoving (precession) was a matter of course. The modal precession comes afterwards, theoretically, for as far back as we can go the optative represents the subjunctive after historical tenses. Against a special iterative optative as distinguished from an iterative subjunctive Stahl protests, as well he may. <Subjunctive and optative are not iterative. It is the leading verb that is iterative, and that makes the sentence iterative. It is thirty-six years (L. G.<sup>2</sup> 597 footn.; cf. L. G.<sup>3</sup> 594 n. 1; A. J. P. III 437) since I objected to the abuse of the terms general and particular—which Goodwin had brought into fashion. 'Whether a condition is particular or general depends simply on the character of the apodosis.' Generic subjunctive and generic optative are strictly speaking quite as much misnomers as iterative subjunctive and iterative optative, but nobody is or ought to be misled by the convenient phraseology. An iterative subjunctive is a subjunctive in an iterative sentence. The prevalence of the 'sidemoods' (S. C. G. 365) in sentences of this sort is due to the greater exactness of the temporal relation, as is shewn by the fact that the home of these constructions is the temporal sentence, in which priority and contemporaneity are of prime importance. Relative

and conditional follow suit. The genesis of this construction is illustrated by an old proverb which Stahl selects doubtless in order to show off his critical acumen. For ἐγγυᾶ, πᾶσα δ' ἄρα, he reads ἐγγυᾶ = ἐγγυῶ. But as the imperative is excluded from the dependent sentence, the subjunctive is used so that we have the series εἰ ἐγγυᾶ, ὅτε ἐγγυᾶ, ὅστις ἐγγυᾶται—<an unluckily example, because of the coincidence of indicative and subjunctive forms>. In other words the subjunctive is an imperative, for Stahl's 'postulierte Annahme' is little else than Krüger's 'geheischte Wirklichkeit'. The sense of the postulate grows weaker and weaker until the subjunctive becomes a mere means of comprehending all the individual cases of a series of phenomena 'individualisierende Zusammenfassung', as Stahl calls it. <But as we have just seen, it is the leading verb and not the subjunctive that does the 'Zusammenfassung'. The subjunctive merely punctuates. The generic character of the subjunctive is mere connotation.> Then follows a long discussion of the use of the subjunctive in comparisons. Comparisons may be made with recurrent actions, the subjunctive being usually employed, although the indicative may be used as in Latin; for, being a Grecian, Stahl is not capable of making the mistake that has actually been made in paralleling the Greek subjunctive with the Latin subjunctive-optative in this class of sentences (see A. J. P. XXV 481).

Now as the subjunctive contains in itself a tendency to realization <cf. Bäumlein's definition, Gr. Modi, p. 177: Tendenz zur Wirklichkeit> it cannot refer to the past, so that in the generic sentence the language <poor thing!> finds itself shut up to the optative which is not bound to any sphere <'Gedanken sind zollfrei'>. Hence the so-called frequentative optative.<sup>1</sup> Of course the original meaning of the optative is effaced here, as the original meaning of the subjunctive is effaced. But if the subjunctive is shut up to the future, the optative is not shut up to the past, and so we find the optative side by side with the generic subjunctive.

And now we proceed to the doctrine of ἄν (κεν). Attempts to establish a difference between ἄν and κεν are scornfully dismissed (S. C. G. 426; A. J. P. III 446, XXIII 139). The proportions of κεν to ἄν in Homer are 3, 3: 1. <Monro gives the figures for the Iliad as 4: 1, showing by comparison a decline in the Odyssey.

<sup>1</sup> By the way, it is an interesting fact, emphasized by Monro, that εἰ with the 'iterative opt.', a very familiar construction (A. J. P. XXIV 360) in prose, is non-Homeric (H. G. § 311). Cf. my Pindar, I. E. xcvi.

In Pindar the two particles nearly balance.> The expulsion of *ἄν* from Homer meets with no favor at the hands of Stahl. *ἄν* belongs to the Ionic element of the epos and both particles are found not only in the epos but in elegiac poetry; they are found in Simonides, Pindar and Bakchylides, manifestly after the Homeric pattern. The combination of *ἄν* *κεν* is significant. Re-writing the oldest part of Homer into Aeolic lacks Stahl's sanction. We do not know what the original Aeolic was, a sad conclusion for the restorationists.

Nothing is said of the etymology of *ἄν* and *κεν*, and it is as well. For the ascertainment of the force of these particles Stahl lays down his method of procedure. First comes Homer and first in Homer comes the principal sentence. Outside of the principal sentence the usage is still in process of development. The particles are not used with the infinitive <saving negligible examples, Pindar I. E. cv>. They are not used with the participle and the use with the preterite is restricted to the unreal past. As to the future indicative—which at any rate is a later formation—it takes the modal particles only by reason of its affinity with the subjunctive. This leaves us, according to Stahl, as the point of departure for the investigation, only the subjunctive and the optative. <As the subjunctive and optative have to do mainly with the future this would seem to indicate an affinity of the particle *ἄν* with the futural idea just as the affinity of *ὁ ἄλλος χρόνος*, of 'another time' is with the future, but that is a heresy with which Stahl could not possibly have any sympathy, and so I return to my task.>

Commenting on the above statement Stahl remarks that there is no indicative unreal of the present <which recalls Goodwin's triumphant insistence on this point (M. T., Rev. Ed., §435)>. There is no habitual or 'intermittent' (S. C. G. 431) indicative with *ἄν* in Homer. Nothing but the black unreal of the past, as if that were not enough. <To be sure, in the absence of countervailing reality, the unreal of the past becomes a potential.> For the combination of the modal particle with the future Stahl contends stoutly, but the examples he adduces are all *κεν*'s and it requires a great deal of good will to see in Pindar, N. 7, 68: *μαθὼν δέ τις ἄν ἐρεί*, an imitation of Il. 4, 176: *καί κέ τις ὦδ' ἐρέει*.<sup>1</sup> <The suggestion *ἀνερεί*, by whomsoever first made (Pindar, I. E. civ; cf.

<sup>1</sup> This suggestion of Stahl was anticipated by Leaf, Il. 22, 66.

Aeschin. 3, 155), has been accepted by Schroeder in his new edition and approved by Wilamowitz in his essay on the Seventh Nemean. The emendation is in the line of another, which Stahl accepts, Plat. Legg. 712, ἀνερωτηθείς, for which he gives Madvig the credit (S. C. G. 433). Cf. Goodwin M. T., Rev. Ed., § 195. Such trifles are not worth quarrelling about (A. J. P. XII 99, XXIII 348). The future with ἄν, a legitimate construction, was probably crowded out by the optative with ἄν and its two admirable tenses (see S. C. G. 444), just as the fut. indic. has been crowded out of the temporal clause by the subjunctive with ἄν and its two admirable tenses. > 'Two facts', says Stahl, 'emerge from the examination of the use of the two modal particles in the principal sentence'. (1) It is used in declarative sentences and not in sentences of 'desire', and (2) it does not affect in the least the meaning of the mood. There is no difference <I should prefer to say 'no translatable' difference> between εἴησι and κεν εἴησι, between Od. 6, 275: καὶ νύ τις ὧδ' εἴησι and Od. 4, 391: καὶ δέ κέ τοι εἴησι. There is no difference between εἴη in Il. 15, 197: βέλτερον εἴη and in Il. 14, 336: νημεσσητόν δέ κεν εἴη. What is the use of it then? Why, by the modal particle the speaker gives expression to his view or conviction that reality belongs to the utterance, and the essence of it is subjective affirmation, a subjective affirmation, we are told, which is to be distinguished from the objective affirmation of ἦ and the rest. <It is, in short, an indicative tag and is often used parallel with the indic. Hateful to me as the gates of Hades is this paltering with objective and subjective, and I honestly think that the old theory of Gottfried Hermann, which Stahl dismisses in a few words, has more substance in it than all this vague talk. The great trouble is that Hermann did not know how to apply his own theory and made ἄν with the subjunctive and the optative with ἄν farther from reality, whereas every ingenuous mind must feel that they are near to reality (comp. A. J. P. III 447). Against the conditional notion of ἄν, Stahl lifts up his heel, but where does his subjective affirmation come from? The acceptance of the condition.>

<Subjective and objective have clearly been overdone, and the frequent use of these terms gives an old-fashioned tone to Stahl's discussions. 'Impersonal' is better than 'objective', 'personal' than 'subjective'. 'Achromatic' and 'chromatic' perhaps still better. But as all affirmation is personal, it is hard to see how we can draw the line between Stahl's ἄν and such confirmatory particles as

ἦ 'verily', δῆ 'clearly', μήν, which outswears the other particles, τοι, which is an appeal to an ideal second person, an appeal to humanity, a cry of the heart for sympathy, whereas πού is an appeal to the heartless world, to the cruel *rerum natura*. ἄν and κεν, as the old conditional theory, point to the speaker's consciousness of limitation, *pro tanto* a guarded affirmation. Of course, this consciousness of limitation may be construed as subjectivity, if you choose. It gives a *quod sciam* reserve. Will and wish that have eventuality in them are nearer to reality than pure will and wish; and in the striving after a more exact future, the subjunctive with ἄν and the optative with ἄν furnish admirable substitutes, the one for the subordinate sentence, the other for the principal. The new future, a manner of desiderative to begin with, cannot make head against the fine old moods and has to yield the road to present and aorist subjunctive with ἄν, to the present and aorist optative with ἄν, wherever temporal exactness is required (A. J. P. XXIII 247).> Of course, says Stahl, this 'modalized' subjunctive has the same rights in the dependent sentence that it has in the independent sentence, but oddly enough it renounces all its rights excepting in the dependent interrogative sentence. Such a limitation as this must give us pause, and we ask with other grammarians whether these are really interrogative sentences or only 'in case' sentences, which are ultimately elliptical conditional sentences (A. J. P. XXIX 273).

In Homer, says Stahl, the optative is used in ideal protases and in equivalent temporal and relative clauses and also in a futural sense. Against the old notion that the εἰ sentences of wish are ideal conditions without an apodosis <like so many bottomless cherubs> Stahl sets his face like a flint (comp. L. G.<sup>3</sup> 261, n. 1); and also against Lange's theory that the εἰ-condition develops from the wish. Against this latter view he argues at length. One of his objections is that the protasis of a conditional sentence may involve a wish against as well as a wish for. <Why not? The imagination conjures up shapes of ill as well as shapes of weal.> In synthetic sentences <non-detachable sentences I should call them in contrast to the detachable or 'parathetic' sentences>, the generic and oblique optatives cannot have ἄν (κεν). 'One cannot affirm and postulate at the same time'. <An ordinary Philistine might say that Stahl, like the rest of us, is performing the double feat at every turn.> Il. 9, 525, the only

passage of the kind, is corrupt, and Stahl suggests *ὄρε πρ* after the analogy of 4, 259. The optative as a *modus obliquus* is limited in Homer <as in Greek generally> to dependence on a past tense. This limitation, not being founded on the notion of indirect discourse <as we see from German (cf. Schlicher, A. J. P. XXVI 60-88; B. L. G., A. J. P. XXVII 205)>, must be explained psychologically. The check in the development is due to the liveliness of the Greek spirit which refused to <obliquify> the present and the future, which would not renounce the immediate representation of the past. <Sheer phrase-making.> The optative as the *modus obliquus* of the subjunctive *modus directus* has the same limitations as the optative as *modus obliquus* of the indicative. It must have a past tense to lean on and there is always the reserve of *repraesentatio*. There is no difference <except a difference of liveliness> between the original subjunctive and the oblique optative. <The increase of this *repraesentatio*, therefore, is an indication of the increasing liveliness of the Greek language. The Epos is slow, the New Testament is gay. In a recent number of the IGF. XXII, Anz. 26, Meltzer has reinforced what I have said (A. J. P. XXIII 130) and has cited Wackernagel's objection to these psychological and phraseological explanations>. Then follows the chapter of the 'assimilation' of subjunctive and optative, after pure optative and optative with *ἄν*. The exceptional use of the opt. w. *κεν* (*ἄν*) in synthetic dependent sentences is treated at great length. For *ἐπὶ* with opt. Od. 4, 222; Il. 19, 208; 24, 227 Stahl would read *ἐπεὶ*. *εἴ κεν* with the opt. after an optative must be taken potentially. 'There is no essential difference', says Stahl, 'between a conditional potential optative and a conditional ideal optative and, besides, the optative with *ἄν* can be used as a future.' It is interesting to observe how Stahl insists on distinctions which he proceeds to wipe out again. In this whole nebulous region of the moods he reminds me of nothing so much as Shelley's Cloud:

I silently laugh  
 At my own cenotaph,  
 And out of the caverns of rain,  
 Like a child from the womb, like a ghost from the tomb,  
 I arise and unbuild it again.

But while he says that there is no essential difference between the conditional optative and the potential optative in protasis, he



bids us beware of the false doctrine, heresy and schism that there is a futural element in the optative itself, for one of Stahl's cardinal principles is the timelessness of the optative. In winding up this section Stahl wages war against the topsy-turvy and un-historical method of regarding the later usage of the language as a norm for the Homeric use, and protests against changing the Homeric use except in conformity with Homeric practice. Of course, he is beating the air here as he is walking on it elsewhere, for nobody will advocate such practices, and as he professes to be averse to polemics, he might spare the circumambient sphere.

And now we come back to *ἄν* and *κεν*. The temporal indifference of the optative in declarative sentences <the same temporal indifference that we have recognized in the Latin perfect subjunctive, A. J. P. XXIX 402> has led to the introduction of *κεν* and *ἄν* in Homer for potential and conditional affirmation, of which Stahl goes on to give a few examples (S. C. G. 430). The chief use of the modal particles with the indicative is to denote unreality. Most of the examples are negative (4: 1). Stahl thinks that the negative started the thing <as indeed one always suspects the 'Geist der stets verneint' of being at the bottom of all trouble>. In Homer unreality in the present is represented by the optative + *ἄν* (*κεν*) <parallel with the wider reach of the present subjunctive in Earlier Latin, which ought not to be pushed to the front in elementary text books>. The unreal imperfect indicative always refers to the past in Homer. The modal particle is never lacking in real unreality. <The suspensive imperfect = *ἔμελλον* must be considered, I suppose, as unreal unreality. The fact is, the line between the ideal and the unreal is determined by the presence or the absence of an opposing reality; see L. G.<sup>3</sup> 258, note 2, 596, 2>. The unreal wish is expressed in Homer by *ᾤφελον* with a particle (S. C. G. 367), as well as by the optative. We see then in Homer the prevalence of *ἄν* and *κεν* with subj. and opt. in certain relations. As time goes on what was tendency in Homer becomes rule. The modal particle *ἄν* associates itself more and more with subjunctive and opt., attaches itself to infinitive and participial sentences, serves to differentiate classes of sentences, serves to give sharper signification. There is a loss as well as a gain (A. J. P. XXIII 254). The futural subjunctive and the futural optative go different ways. The futural subjunctive reigns in the dependent, the futural optative in the principal sentence. There are traces of survival here and there as in Pindar

P. 9, 120 where, however, *ἄν* may belong to *θορών* and not to *ψάυσειε* (see B. L. G. in loc. or Bakchyl. 5, 110; A. J. P. XXVII 482). Opt. with *κεν* (*ἄν*) disappears from the protasis of the conditional sentence <except where the writer is quoting actually or mentally>. *ἄν* (*κεν*) with the fut. inf. has a sworn foe in Stahl <as it has in me, for I have put it thus: 'ἄν with the fut. ind. is dead before ἄν with the inf. comes in'. To be sure we have Il. 22, 110, which Stahl ignores, as well he may, and Il. 9, 684, which is an *oratio obliqua* echo of v. 417>. Then we have a long chapter devoted to the correction of the texts that exhibit the solecism and Stahl proceeds to batter down open doors and bravely slay the slain. Pindar P. 1, 109, he reads *κλείζειν* <which has MS warrant> where I say 'the construction is due to *anacoluthia* rather than to survival', and he quotes Bekk., Anecd. 127, 24, where I quote Lucian (Sol. III 555 R.)—a more interesting authority. <Cf. also [Just. Martyr] Ep. ad Diogn. 2, 4.> 'In Attic', says Stahl, 'the optative with *ἄν* loses its temporal indifference and ceases to refer to the past (see S. C. G. 435). Inscriptional parallelisms between subj. + *κεν* and opt. in protasis are next discussed, and several passages elsewhere in which one might expect the subjunctive and finds the opt. (cf. P. O. 13, 101, I. E. cvii). The survival of the pure subjunctive in clauses where subjunctive with *ἄν* might be expected is documented by a long array of passages from post-Homeric poets, especially in Attic tragedy <which not only loves epic touches but is often hyperepic>. The Pindaric passages are cited, but S. does not stop to notice the uniformity of Pindar's usage (I. E. cvii). At the omission of *ἄν* in the dialogue of Attic tragedy, he balks; in Attic comedy, he proceeds to emend. In Ionic prose (Herodotos) he notes the omission in temporal sentences of limit <where the notion of finality helps to keep the construction alive, as the subjunctive is kept alive in English sentences of the same sort (A. J. P. XXIV 401)>, but he wages war against the omission in Attic prose except in Thukydides. The historian of the great tragedy of the Peloponnesian war may well be influenced by tragic usage, so that when he omits *ἄν* in temporal sentences of limit and in generic subjunctive sentences we are not shocked beyond measure (cf. A. J. P. XXIII 140). However, Thuk. VI 21, 1: *εἰ ξυστῶσιν αἱ πόλεις φοβηθείσαι* he considers 'bedenklich'. But while S. is so merciless in damning the omission of *ἄν* in subjunctive clauses outside a certain range, he

is extremely liberal in allowing the omission of the particle *ἄν* in opt. clauses. See my S. C. G. 450, where I have discussed the matter at some length. Pindar P. 10, 21: *θεὸς εἴη | ἀπήμων κέαρ*, where recent editors recognize a concessive opt., he pronounces nonsense.

In post-Homeric Greek Stahl recognizes a great advance in the use of the *ἄν* with the preterite that runs counter to reality, in the affirmative-potential use of *ἄν* of regular or occasional occurrence, but the limitation of the intermittent use is emphasized <which can readily be discerned from the range of examples in S. C. G. 431>. Another extension that Stahl notes is the unreal wish with *εἴθε, εἰ γάρ*, which according to him is conclusive against the origin of the unreal condition from the unreal wish. <It would be useless to urge the point that emergence in literature is not identical with emergence in language. This is the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of much that passes for historical syntax>, and Stahl goes on to shew that in contrast with this innovation the optative is used by preference for the realizable wish. But who knows, and who in a moment of excitement cares, what is realizable, what not? No wonder that passionate wishes for the unreal sometimes take the optative form. It is a pity that Stahl had not thought of that when he was enlarging on *ἔλοιτο* (A. J. P. XXIX 402).

At a point beyond the limits of this article Stahl (S. 369 flg.) distinguishes four kinds of optative with *ἄν*. 1) The affirmative. 2) The potential. 3) The conditional. 4) The desiderative. Needless to say I have no sympathy with this kind of analysis. There is no specific gravity to keep the rings apart as in some kinds of *pousse-café*; and moreover in what he calls here the desiderative form of the wish *βουλοίμην ἄν* (p. 274) he has to admit that with verbs of wishing and willing the optative with *ἄν* is pleonastic. Everybody knows that *βουλοίμην ἄν* is preferred in sober prose to the pure optative of wish, which is a rare form except in poetry (S. C. G. 398). The orators prefer the calmer statement to the passionate wish, just as we say 'I should like' rather than 'would that—' which one might live a life time without hearing in current conversation. According to Stahl *ἐβουλόμην (ἥθελον) ἄν* is a 'forshoving of modality' to match *βουλοίμην ἄν*. It is sadly illogical according to him. It is not the wish but the thing that is unreal. This is a deplorable inelasticity in Stahl. The indicative in final clauses after an unreal wish and the like is

explained in his own tortuous way. It is simply an organic part of the wish or condition, and for that matter the leading clause might be omitted (A. J. P. IV 434). The old-fashioned generic optative dies out more and more. <The survival with the infinitive, for the majority of the later examples belong under this head, is easily explained on the ground of the affinity between optative and infinitive (S. C. G. 400; A. J. P. XXIV 106).> In the post-Homeric stage generic subjunctive and generic optative (optative of indefinite frequency) become more sharply distinguished <a matter of connotation, as we have seen>. The parallel use of the indicative Stahl calls 'einheitliche Zusammenfassung' in contradistinction to the 'individualisierende Zusammenfassung' of the subjunctive and optative. This sounds very subtle, but as soon as Stahl begins to apply it and says that the present indicative in conditional sentences is used when a general assumption is made and there is no thought of the individual cases he runs counter to the feeling of the language. Elsewhere he sins chiefly by over-refining. Here he reverses the true state of things. *εἰ τις*, as I said long ago, is a two-edged sword (A. J. P. III 438). Pindar shifts according to the tense from pres. indic. to aor. subj. (I. E. cvii).

The treatment of the optative in oblique discourse presents nothing new, as f. i. the occasional use of the mood after the perfect of the farther end = aorist. Nor is it worth while to dwell on the examples of the optative as representatives of the subjunctive in *oratio obliqua*. Causal sentences with optatives for indicatives belong to the rarities. The corresponding construction in Latin—*quod* with the subjunctive—is usually represented in Greek by *ὡς* with the participle. The O. O. examples of the opt. in causal sentences are nearly all from Xenophon <in conformity with his hyper-orthodox love of the mood>. Relative sentences in which the optative stands for the indicative are also infrequent. Notorious is Soph. O. R. 1247: *ὕψ' ὧν θάνοι μὲν αὐτός*. Sometimes the opt. is due to the merging of relative and interrogative, as Pindar O. 6, 49, where see my note, sometimes to the assimilative swing of other O. O. optatives. Nowhere does Stahl recognize the principle that the shift from *εἰάν* with subj. to *εἰ* with opt. is a mechanical tradition from the time of an original *εἰ* with subj. (S. C. G. 399), and when he comes to Soph. Tr. 903: *κρύψας' ἑαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι*, he is greatly guilty of a resolution like this: *ἐνθα μή τις ἂν αὐτὴν εἰσίδῃ*, unless we treat Stahl's Greek as he himself has treated so

many passages and suppress  $\alpha\nu$  before  $\alpha\nu$ .  $\epsilon\nu\theta\alpha$  as catercousin to  $\iota\nu\alpha$ , which never quite lost its relative sense, might readily take the final construction of  $\iota\nu\alpha$ . The old question whether the opt. +  $\alpha\nu$  can be used in a clause representing  $\alpha\nu$  with subj. (cf. P. 9, 120) is decided by Stahl in the negative. Nearly all the passages are shaky. There are two cases. Either  $\alpha\nu$  holds over from the  $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$ ,  $\delta\varsigma$   $\alpha\nu$  of the original form, a bit of sheer carelessness in the transfer, or, which Stahl will not allow, there is a notion of potentiality. <On  $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$   $\alpha\nu$  + opt. see A. J. P. IV 418 footn.; XXIV 403.> Then follows a long list of passages in which subjunctive and opt. forms are used without any material difference.

The old form, the Homeric form of indirect discourse with merely a shift of the persons, does not die out <nay, it lives on, awaiting its restoration>, but the oblique opt. gains ground more and more. Herodotos and Thukydides favor the direct form; Xenophon the 'modus obliquus'; Plato not so much. This general statement is followed by statistics, the provenience of which is not given. Then come the consecutive sentences, practically post-Homeric (A. J. P. VII 166). Thence they spread. As for the inf. with  $\alpha\nu$  or  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$  Stahl denies the genuineness of Il. 9, 684 (see above, p. 17). The earliest example is Sappho 68. <Lyric fragments must always be cited with extreme caution.> Next comes Pindar with  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$  <I. E. cv>. The participle begins to take  $\alpha\nu$  in the Attic drama. On P. 10, 62 'see Christ', see others. The orators use both constructions freely, the infinitive more freely than the participle, because there are more infinitive constructions than participial <a somewhat superfluous observation, if it were not for the nonsensical use so often made of statistics>. Then follows a long chapter on the position of  $\alpha\nu$  and the repetition of  $\alpha\nu$  <S. C. G. 459 foll.>.

Ὅπω τὰν μεσάταν ὁδὸν ἄνυμεν. Instead of absolving my task in two or three numbers, as I had hoped to do, I have thus far traversed much less than half of Stahl's Syntax of the Greek Verb. But I will no longer abuse the patience of the readers of the Journal and the contributors thereto. The American Journal of Philology is not the American Journal of Greek Syntax, and I must say good bye to Stahl, at least for a long time, and instead of discussing the rest of the portly volume, I will content myself with jotting down references to the various articles in which I have handled the subjects that remain. There are coincidences and differences enough to furnish forth another series of articles, but

I doubt whether it would be worth while to go over the well-trodden paths for the sake of illustrations to my own writings. I shudder as I recall the conditional sentence III 158 foll. and the temporal sentence II 465 foll.; XXIV 388 (where Fuchs has his hole), and the final sentence IV 416 foll.; VI 53 foll., and the consecutive sentences VII 16 foll., and the infinitive, both the articular, which I christened, and the anarthrous III 192-202; VIII 328-37; IX 254; XXVII 201, and the participle IX 137 foll., and the negatives I 45-47; III 202; X 124; and then think of the notes to my Justin Martyr, to my Pindar, and the recurrent syntactical spirits in *Brief Mention*. I might, it is true, have written a little article headed 'What I have learned from Stahl', but even then there would have been a running comment with indications as to what I did not need to learn from Stahl.

One word more, and that a word of apology to the eminent author and the benevolent reader. In going over by the fierce light of print what I have written about this monumental book, which reminds me by its massiveness of the Palais de Justice at Brussels, I am very sorry for my tone, which would have been unpardonable in a younger man, hardly to be forgiven even in a man who is Stahl's senior. Unfortunately the fragments of Solon are jumbled in my mind, as they are in the MSS, with the verses of Theognis,—Solon the sweet-tempered, Theognis the sour. The likeness of my old master, Boeckh, looks down upon me as I write. His Solonian motto at sixty-five was *γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος*, and I try to live up to that motto, but every now and then a musty piece of wisdom is offered to me for my digestion, and then I am fain to say with the Megarian: *μή με διδασκ'· οὔτοι τηλίκος εἰμὶ μαθεῖν* (A. J. P. XXVIII 107).

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CORRIGENDA. A. J. P. XXIX 263, l. 35, read 'the mood of the wish'. 264, l. 18, read XXVII. On the same page I should have noted that *πτώσεις ἰδ αἰ* and *πτώσεις κοιναί* are terms that I adopted many years ago from Westphal, Gr Formenl. XIV, *πτώσεις κοιναί* being the regular cases, *πτώσεις ἰδ αἰ* the case-like formations such as *-θι* and *-θεν*. XXIX 272, footn., read Ginneken.